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Drafi Resolutian
on naianal parliaments, European securily and defence
and the road to the 1996 intergovemmental conference
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing the importance of the success of the 1996 intergovernmental conference for implementing
a true European security and defence policy, built around WEU;
(ii) Convinced of the need to associate national parliaments closely with the development of a European
security and defence policy in the framework of the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental confer-
ence;
(iif) Considering that the intergovernmental conference must result in a clear division of responsibilities
in security matters between the European Union and WEU and, in defence matters, between WEU and the
member states;
(iv) Noting with concern the weakness of Europe's means of intervention and particularly the fact that
the CFSP can take only economic or diplomatic measures, whereas there are numerous sources of crisis
and conflict in the centre of Europe, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and Africa;
(v) Wishing to strengthen its links with the national parliaments and to co-operate on a basis of equality
and reciprocity with the European Parliament in order to achieve better parliamentary supervision of WEU
in joint security and defence questions and of the European Union in CFSP questions;
(vi) Believing that any steps towards bringing defence matters within the competence of the European
Commission and European Parliament might endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and security mat-
ters by national parliaments and the WEU Assembly,
INvITps T}IE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES
1. To intensify parliamentary co-operation with a view to implementing an effective system of parlia-
mentary supervision of the CFSP and European defence;
2. To promote exchanges between their respective foreign affairs, defence and European affairs com-
mittees and their co-operation with the corresponding committees of the WEU Assembly with a view to
preparing the 1996 intergovernmental conference and subsequently the satisfactory implementation of the
decisions the conference will be called upon to take;
3. To encourage greater transparency on the part of governments regarding their European policies so
as to enable parliaments to exercise more effective supervision, keep public opinion informed and make it
aware of the issues at stake in the European process.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Sir John Hunt, Ropporteur)
I.Introduction
1. The Maasricht Treaty includes a series of
protocols and declarations adopted at conferences
of representatives of governments of the member
states of the European Union, held in Rome, on
15th December 1990, and Brussels, on 3rd
February 1992. One such declaration, on the
" rOle of the national partaments in the European
Union ", states that lt is important to encourage
greater participation by national parliaments in
the activities of the European Union.
2. Admittedly, since the inception of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, national parliaments
have been involved in European affairs to varying
degrees, albeit in a general way, and since the exe-
cutive is pre-eminent in the management of
national political affairs, their r6le has not always
matched their expectations. Debates on the direc-
tion of government policy on Europe and exami-
nation and voting on community legislation adop-
ted by the Council of Ministers of the Union give
national parliaments only a relative right to over-
see and supervise choices made by the European
Union in the areas for which it is responsible, the
consequences of which affect all member coun-
tries and the political life of each one.
3. Although long dominated by economic,
social and cultural questions, an important quali-
tative change was infroduced into the European
debate with the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty. This provides for the establishment of a
corlmon foreign and security policy (Title V of
the Treaty), directly concerned with nvo distinc-
tive symbols of national sovereignty: foreign pol-
icy and security (and its corollary, defence). The
implementation of the CFSP is doubtless one of
the greatest challenges the Union must face if it
wishes to be more than just an economic power, in
a world that has become unsettled, unstable even,
since the main East-West confrontation gave way
to a myriad of local conflicts, domestic and
foreign, political, economic and military.
4. The responsibility of national parliaments in
this area has increased, for such issues extend
beyond the boundaries of the fifteen European
Union member states, since they concern the
Union's r6le and place in the world and deter-
mine, in part, the behaviour towards it of other
international players: states, regional gtoupings,
international organisations. The implementation
of the CFSP transcends purely national frames of
reference, making joint thinking about its implica-
tions imperative, and equally so the emergence of
a European parliamentary consciousness which
has its roots in the national parliaments, them-
selves the guardians of the sovereignty of the
nations that make up the European Union.
5. Furthermore, national parliaments are not
the only assemblies concerned with European
policy. The European Parliament, the WEU
Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly
and the Partamentary Assembly of the OSCE, to
mention only the most prominent such institu-
tions, are all party, often randomly, to the debate
on matters relating to the CFSP. Tlvo of them, the
European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, are
nevertheless more directly concerned with deve-
lopments in relation to this question.
6. The European Parliament, whose powers are
strengthened under the Maastricht Treaty, wishes
to play the leading r6le as the parliamentary com-
ponent of the CFSP. Since Maastricht, it has sev-
eral times taken a position on matters of foreign,
security and defence policy in Europe, basing
itself on Article J.7 of the Treaty on European
Union, which provides that " the presidency shall
consult the European Parliament on the main
aspects and the basic choices of the common
foreign and securiry policy and shall ensure that
the views of the European Parliament are duly
taken into consideration ...0'. Henceforth it will
inevitably have to be taken into account, being
associated with the preparatory work for the 1996
intergovernmental conference, which is to deal,
inter alia, with the future evolution of the CFSP
and consequently the rdle WEU is called upon to
play in these matters as the defence component of
the European Union.
7. The WEU Assembly has no intention of
relinquishing its powers which are based on
Article IX' of the modified Brussels Treaty.
Through its recommendations to the Council of
Ministers and other initiatives, including a collo-
quy in Paris in October 1994, which brought toge-
ther the chairmen of parliamentary defence and
foreign affairs commiffees of all countries linked
1. " The Council of Western European Union shall make an
annual report on its activities and in particular conceming the
control of armaments to an Assembly composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe. "
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to WEU and Russian parliamentarians, the
Assembly is contributing to thinking in WEU,
prepulratory to the intergovernmental conference.
This contribution is of prime importance as the
conference's decisions on WEU will affect the
Assembly's future work and existence.
8. The national parliaments for their part are
intensifying their co-ordination, as the inter-
governmental conference approaches, through
two forums: CEAC (Conference of European
Affairs Committees) and the Conference of
Speakers of National Parliaments, which also
have a liaison r6le with the European Parliament
which has a seat on both.
9. Without prejudging the outcome of the inter-
governmental conference, it can be said that the
development of the CFSP, and, in particular, the
possible inclusion of defence alongside security
aspects, will be one of the most sensitive subjects
for debate. The limits and areas of responsibility
of the CFSP must be better defined, on the basis
of existing experience and through judicious and
flexible application of the principle of subsidiar-
ity so as to avoid institutions being paralysed and
with due respect for the sovereignty of member
states. To this end, it would be desirable, at the
conference, to redefine the institutional links bet-
ween the Union, the member states, other Euro-
pean and transatlantic organisations involved and
the national parliaments.
II. Earopean security and defence:
towards a common poliry
10. In his welcoming address to delegations of
the Assembly of WEU, meeting in Paris for the
June 1994 session, the President of the French
National Assembly, Philippe S6guin, observed
that " the new world situation unfolding before us
demonstrates how essential is the need for greater
co-ordination among European states in matters
of defence and security ".
11. This admission of inadequacy is also an
indictment of the relative failure to implement the
CFSP, even if account is taken of the very short
time the Maastricht Treaty has been in force.
12. Simultaneously, WEU has launched a pro-
cess of adaptation to the new geostrategic situa-
tion in Europe by also taking into consideration
the Maastricht decisions that confirmed it as the
defence component of the European Union. In the
run-up to the intergovernmental conference,
whose decisions on the CFSP will have repercus-
sions on the organisation, WEU is developing its
own thinking on its future rdle in the context of
deepening the CFSP and the possible inclusion
therein of the defence dimension.
(a) European Unian and the CFSP
13. The Maastricht Treaty is the outcome of a
laborious and complex process of discussion and
compromise between the member states of the
European Economic Community, the incomplete
nature of which is illustrated by the decision to
convene a conference, in principle in 1996, to cla-
rify certain matters in relation to the functioning
of the European Union and the CFSP.
(i) Title V of the Maastricht Treaty
14. The CFSP is the subject of Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty, which comprises Articles J to
J.11. Although in practice, its application seems
very remote from the text, the latter nevertheless
includes a series of provisions binding on states
which have subscribed unreservedly to that part of
the treaty'.
15. Article J.1.2 sets out the five principal
objectives of the CFSP, namely:
- 
to safeguard the common values, funda-
mental interests and independence of the
Union;
- 
to strengthen the security of the Union and
its member states in all ways;
- 
to preserve peace and strengthen inter-
national security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter,
as well as the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris
Charter;
- 
to promote international co-operation;
- 
to develop and consolidate democracy and
the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
16. It is imponant to bear these objectives in
mind, as to misunderstand them often creates
confusion and disappointment when progress on
the CFSP is being evaluated. In point of fact,
these objectives stem from the search for a
consensus likely to be acceptable to all the coun-
tries of the Union, and have led the latter, first, to
align themselves on general, even vaguely wor-
ded principles, and, second, to defer the necessary
discussion on procedures for implementing them
and possibly extending them to defence matters
until the 1996 conference.
17. The second and third paragraphs of the same
article reveal a concern to make the CFSP an ins-
trument for affirming the Union as a power that
counts, not only in economic terms but also politi-
cally, and, by a time yet to be defined, militarily. It
2. Denmark is not involved in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of decisions and actions of the Union with defence
implications. (European Council, Edinburgh, llth-l2th
December 1992. Conclusions of the hesidency, Part B).
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is in this perspective that one must consider
Article J.4 which refers to'o the eventual framing
of a common defence policy which might in time
lead to a common defence " (Article J.4.1). This
article, which also concerns WEU, refers to the
1996 intergovernmental conference " and having
in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article
XII3 of the Brussels Treaty o', to the discussion on
the r6le that WEU will be called upon to play in
its relations with the Union.
(ii) The 1996 intergoventmental conference
18. The Maastricht Treaty is the result of a hasty
but necessary compromise, the aim of which was
to position the European Union vis-d-vis the poli-
tical and military changes that had occurred in
Europe and the rest of the world since the end of
the 1980s. Nevertheless, the consensus rule did
not allow decisions of major scope to be taken,
above all in the area of the CFSP. Hence the deci-
sion to convene a conference of representatives of
governments of the member states in 1996 to exa-
mine " those provisions of this treaty for which
revision is provided " (Article N.2).
19. The 1996 review must deal with the follow-
ing topics, referred to in the Treaty on European
Union:
-the policies and forms of co-operation
introduced by this Treaty (Article B of the
Treaty);
- 
the common foreign and security policy
(Article J.4.6);
- 
widening the field of application of the
procedure known as co-decision (new
Article 189 B of the Treaty establishing
the European Community) ;
- 
possible definition of a hierarchy of the
different categories of community acts
(Declaration on the hierarchy of Commu-
nity acts);
- 
extension of the responsibilities of the
Community to three new areas: energy,
civil protection and tourism (Declaration
on civil protection, energy and tourism).
20. ln fact, the intergovernmental conference is
also to decide on the new European architecture
best fitted to meet the challenges of the future, be
they political, economic, military, social, ecologi-
cal, etc. The debate on institutional questions will
3. Article )(II of the moffied Brussels Treaty provides that
' After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the high
contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party
thereto provided that he shall have previously given one
year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government ".
Unlike the Council of Ministers, the Assembly of WEU takes
the view that the period of fifty years runs from 1954, the
date of signarure of the modified Brussels Treaty, and not
1948 (Brussels Treaty).
be central to the discussions since only when an
optimal framework for decision-making has been
defined, avoiding extremes of national or pro-
European sentiment, will the Union be able to give
a coherent content to its decisions in essential areas
like the CFSP and implement them effectively.
21. Looking beyond the debate on deepening
and widening, on federal Europe " h la carte " and
on the respective r6les and powers of the Council,
the Commission, the European Parliament, the
national parliaments and other institutions and
organisations, the question is basically whether
the evolution will be towards renationalising
European policies or " Europeanising " national
policies. The answer will be decisive for defining
the r6le and place ofEurope as a political and eco-
nomic unit in the world of 2000. As far as security
and defence are concerned, WEU,linked in accor-
dance with Article J.4 to the intergovernmental
conference process, is the organisation best pla-
ced to devise a project that is coherent, clear and
devoid of all ambiguity.
(b) WEU and the definitian of a common
European defence polity
22. WEU is the only European organisation
with responsibility in security and defence mat-
/ers. Nevertheless, despite its reactivation in
l984,it still gives the impression of not being in a
position to exercise that responsibility fully in
face of the geopolitical and geostrategic changes
of the last five years. Its evolution is a gradual
process which also takes account of the evolution
of the two other organisations with which WEU is
lhked, i.e. the European Union and NAIO, as is
apparent from study of the texts adopted at Maas-
tricht in 1991 and Noordwijk in 1994. To these
documents should be added the European Com-
mission's report on the intergovernmental con-
ference, the report of the Reflection Group of the
European Union and the memorandum on the
United Kingdom Government's approach to the
treatment of European defence issues at the 1996
intergovernmental conference, released on 2nd
March 1995, which presents a series of proposals
for sfrengthening the organisation.
(i) The Maastricht declarations
23. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two
declarations by WEU member states intended to
define the organisation's place and r6le in relation
to the European Union and NAIO.
24. [n the first, member states " agree on the
need to develop a genuine security and defence
identity and a greater European responsibility in
defence matters ". To achieve this " WEU will be
developed as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union and as a means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ".
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25. In asserting itself as the " defence compo-
nent ", WEU may appear to be linking its future to
the institutional development of the Union, as the
organisation has committed itself at the same time
to a review, in 1996, of its declaration annexed to
the Maasfricht Treaty, in parallel with the inter-
govemmental conference (point D of the declara-
tion on Western European Union).
26. Furthermore, WEU states that it is " pre-
pared, at the request of the European Union, to
elaborate and implement decisions and actions
of the Union which have defence implications ".
To this end, the declaration presents a series of
measures aimed at developing 'o a close working
relationship " between the two organisations
(point A of the declaration), namely:
- 
synchronisation of the dates and venues of
meetings and harmonisation of working
methods;
- 
establishment of close co-operation bet-
ween the Councils of Ministers and the
respective secretariats ;
- 
harmonisation of the presidencies;
- 
keeping the Commission informed on
WEU activities;
- 
encouragement of co-operation between
the WEU Assembly and the European Par-
liament.
27. The second declaration concerns the enlar-
gement of WEU to include the member states of
the European Union and other states, members of
NATO. According to this declaration:
" States which are members of the European
Union are invited to accede to WEU on
conditions to be agreed in accordance with
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty,
or to become observers if they so wish ... ".
Simultaneously, European member states of
NATO are offered associate member status.
28. Nevertheless, application of the text is not
easy, despite its apparent simplicity. In practice,
since the decisions taken by the Council in Peters-
berg in Jtne 1992, only one member state of the
European Union, Greece, has become a fulImem-
ber of WEU. Denmark has requested observer sta-
tus, as has Ireland. When Austria, Finland and
Sweden joined the Union it was thought that two
of these countries, if not all three, might qualify tojoin as full members but in fact, for the time
being, they only have observer status, placing
them, in theory, in a position similar to associate
partners a in WEU, although they are entitled to
take part in the discussions at the 1996 inter-
governmental conference that will deal with the
CFSP and consequently with WEU's future.
(ii) The Noordwijk declaration
29. At the Kirchberg meeting on 9th May 1994,
the Council of Ministers, in line with the deci-
sions taken at Maastricht and within the frame-
work of the preparation of the intergovernmental
conference, requested the Permanent Council
to begin work on the definition of a European
defence policy. The Dutch presidency had the task
of preparing a preliminary document which was
examined and adopted by the WEU ministers at
Noordwijk on 14th November 1994.
30. The document defines four levels of Euro-
pean responsibilities and interests in defence mat-
ters (tr.4), as follows:
- 
WEU governments have a direct responsi-
bility for the security and defence of their
own peoples and territories;
- [they] have a responsibility to project the
security and stability presently enjoyed in
the West throughout the whole of Europe;
- [they] have an interest, in order to rein-
force European security, in fostering
stability in the southern Mediterranean
countries;
- [ttrey] are ready to take on their share of the
responsibility for the promotion of secur-
ity, stability and the values of democracy in
the wider world, including through the exe-
cution of peace-keeping and other crisis-
management measures under the authority
of the United Nations Security Council or
the CSCE', acting either independently or
through WEU or NATO. They are also
ready to address new security challenges
such as humanitarian emergencies, proli-
feration, terrorism, international crime and
environmental risks, including those rela-
ted to disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
31. This list is not exhaustive. These are merely
the broad outlines to be followed, for the docu-
ment also states that " the full development of a
common defence policy will require a corlmon
assessment and definition of ... the substance of a
European defence ... This will in turn depend
upon a judgment of the rOle the European Union
wishes to play in the world and the contribution it
wishes to make to security in its immediate neigh-
bourhood and in the wider world " (tr.6). This is
tantamount to assigning the task of elaborating a
European security and defence policy to the Euro-
pean Council, when it should rather be the res-
ponsibility of WEU, as the defence component of
the Union, to deal with all aspects of this question.
5. Now OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe.
4. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lawia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
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32. At the same time, it should be borne in mind
that these preliminary conclusions represent but a
first step for WEU, towards preparation of the
intergovernmental conference; this explains their
generalised tone, which is also linked to the need
for member states to reach consensus on the defi-
nition of European defence and its objectives. In
this connection it is noteworthy that the list as it
stands does not include the defence of Europe's
economic interests, although this important aspect
of contemporary international relations falls
within WEU's sphere of responsibility 6 and the
United States has integrated this aspect fully into
its concept of national security '. Since lst April
1995, France has also established a committee on
competitiveness and economic security for which
a secretariat is provided by the National Defence
Secretariat-General under the supervision of the
Prime Ministert. A report to the President of the
Republic on the powers of this committee notes
that control over the flow of information governs
economic performance and hence job protection.
It underpins international power relations which
may be confrontational or tend towards partner-
ship'.
33. In order to deal with this new situation, the
report advocates a new organisation of strategic
information around the notion of " economic
intelligence ", defined as " a body of co-ordinated
research, processing, dissemination and protec-
tion of information activities bringing together the
state and the world of business ... ". This aware-
ness, in a context where cold war confrontation
has partly given way to increasing economic com-
petition between large commercial groups (as has
been evident from the GAIT negotiations and the
creation of the World Trade Organisation) extends
beyond a strictly national framework as a result of
growing interpenetration and integration of the
economies of the countries of the European
Union.
(iii) The European Commission
34. [n a report to the European Union Reflection
Group on the intergovernmental conference, the
Commission sets out its views on the r6le of the
6. Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty provides
that " At the request of any of the high contracting parties the
Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit
them to consult with regard to any situation which may
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
should arise, or a danger to economic stability. "
7. tn an interview with Newsweek on the Franco-American
espionage question which surfaced at the end of February
1995, the Trade Secretary of the Clinton Administration, Mr.
Ron Brown stated that United States national security inter-
ests were inextricably linked with its economic interests.
(Quoted in Ir Monde, 2nd March 1995).
8. Official Journal of the French Republic, No. 80, page
5376,4th April1995.
9. Idem, page 5375.
national parliaments and the evolution of the
CFSP. It states that, in practice, consideration by
national parliaments of Community legislative
proposals falls essentially within national consti-
tutional practices. Moreover national and Euro-
pean parliamentary bodies are intensifying their
contacts in order to develop a corlmon parliamen-
tary strategy towards the intergovernmental
conference. This approach and the difficulties rai-
sed by the ratification of the treaty in certain
countries show the importance of involving natio-
nal parliaments in building Europe 
- 
a process
which it is hoped will continue to increase.
35. Regarding the CFSP, the Commission's opi-
nion is somewhat qualified, admitting that its
implementation has been difficult, involving
delays and lacking in effectiveness. Moreover,
structural, legal and financial difficulties persist,
particularly at the level of decision-making, choice
of various instruments, application of the una-
nimity rule, essential links between pillars etc.
Another link has not operated satisfactorily: the
one which was to be established with WEU,
which is nevertheless an integral part of the deve-
lopment of the European Union. According to the
report, the complexity of the present system
encourages procedural debates to the detriment of
debates on substantive issues. To increase effec-
tiveness there must be greater continuity between
the CFSP and national policies, by earlier and
more perceptive analysis of long-, medium- and
short-term external developments and by clarifi-
cation of its operation. These adaptations alone
will allow the future of the CFSP to be considered
with greater interest.
(iv) The progress report of the Chnirman of the
Reflection Group on the 1996 intergovernmental
conference
36. Published in early September 1995, the
report considers that it is necessary to increase
" each national parliament's control over its
government in Union affairs ". The Reflection
Group also agreed on the principle that it is not
useful to create a second European parliamentary
chamber. The guidelines proposed are based on
" formulae for the association of national parlia-
ments with the Community institutions " and
study a proposal for the " creation of a High
Consultative Council on subsidiarity, composed
of delegations from national parliaments ".
37. Regarding the CFSP, the report separates the
Union's external action from security and defence
matters. Regarding the Union's external action,
opinions dffier on analysing the causes of the dis-
functioning: lack of practice, of political will, a
structural problem o' of a mismatch between ambi-
tious ... objectives and inadequate insffuments for
achieving them ". Furthermore, certain members
distinguish between two types of Union external
action: " one working well and the other not (the
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first is the external dimension of Community poli-
cies and the second the CFSP) ", the real pio6tem
lying in the separation between the political and
economic dimensions.
38. The group recommends that the Union
should be given international legal personality
and that its foreign policy objectives be clearly
defined and interinstitutional co-operation impro-
ved. As to the European Parliament, certain mem-
bers are calling for the development of the present
provisions on the latter's right to be informed,
others talk of a closer association of the Parlia-
ment with the definition of the major guidelines of
the CFSP and the management of external politi-
cal affairs of the Union through formulae ensuring
confidentiality.
39. European security and defence are envis-
aged in a strictly collective manner. Today it is a
matter of examining more closely the possibilities
of EU/WEU relations, reconciling respect for
consensus and the Union's ability to act, looking
at the Union's lack of symmetry in security and
defence matters, giving further thought to all mat-
ters concerning a possible internal market for
arms 
- 
a question which seems crucial for the
future of an autonomous European defence capa-
bility, whose consequences are very important for
the future existence and maintenance of European
industrial and technological capabilities in this
field.
(v) The memorandum of the United Kingdom
Governmentlo
40. The memorandum on the United Kingdom
Government's approach to the ffeatment of Euro-
pean defence issues at the 1996 intergovemmental
conference was released on2ndMarch 1995. This
was the first contribution by a European govern-
ment to the preparation of the intergovernmental
conference dealing with European security and
defence matters.
41. The main thoughts set out in the memoran-
dum are as follows:
- 
NATO is the central component of the
security and defence of Europe;
- 
Europe must be more outward looking,
" pulling its full weight internationally and
acting as a power for good in the world ";
- 
WEU 'o has an important and growing rOle
to play in the development of a European
security and defence identity ". It must
remain autonomous and separate from the
European Union;
- 
" the basis for European action in the
defence and security field should be inter-
governmental, based on co-operation bet-
ween nation states ".
42. On WEU, in order to improve the decision-
making process, the memorandum proposes crea-
ting " a new WEU body at head of state and
government level involving full members, asso-
ciate members and observers ". This body
" would be built on the WEU treaty base and the
rights and responsibilities of its members would
thus mirror those already in force in the WEU
Council ". At operational level it is necessary to
" strengthen WEU's planning capabilities " and
" develop its practical arrangements such as a
situation centre and improved intelligence-handling
capabilities ".
43. This document has been quite well received
in other European Union and WEU countries. It is
clear nevertheless that this contribution is open to
discussion and possibly to amendment during the
intergovernmental conference, particularly in
regard to the question of decision-making pro-
cedures in the new consultative body proposed in
the memorandum, in the event of that idea being
adopted. The r61e assigned to the associate part-
ners in such a body must also be clarified in order
to avoid the latter being left " out in the cold ".
Nor is there mention of the democratic supervi-
sion that parliaments might exercise over the deci-
sions of this body, the WEU Assembly having
only a consultative rdle 
- 
unlike the European
Parliament which has certain powers of co-deci-
sion and supervision in the European Union.
III. Parlinrnents in Europe and their rdle in
the commonforeign and security policy
44. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two
declarations concerning the national parliaments,
one on " the r61e of national parliaments in the
European Union ", the other on'o the Conference
of Parliaments ". In both cases the principle is to
involve parliaments in the Maastricht process and
also to reassure them in view of the wider powers
of the European Parliament within the European
Union.
45. Nevertheless, the attention the contracting
parties pay to the national parliaments can also be
explained by political considerations with the aim
of facilitating ratification of the treaty. Further-
more, the two declarations on the r6le of national
parliaments, which are still very general, place the
emphasis on co-operation with the European
Parliament. If the trend in the framework of the
CFSP is towards a corlmon defence policy, which
WEU is intended to embody, reference should
also be made to the WEU Assembly, even if the
preliminary conclusions on this question adopted
by the Council of Ministers in Noordwijk make
no reference to the Assembly's r6le.10. WEU Assembly document A/WEU/DG (95) 9.
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@) Narianal parliaments and preparatian of the 1996
int e r gov e m m e ntal c o nle r e n c e
46. The intergovernmental conference is of the
utmost interest to the national parliaments. The
decisions to be taken on the future of the Euro-
pean Union will have political, economic and
social consequences which must be carried into
effect in each member state with the essential co-
operation of the national parliamens. It is there-
fore logical that the latter should, from now on,
contribute to the reform of the European institu-
tions.
47. Their task is a delicate one in relation to the
CFSP, as the shape of the latter is still ill-defined
and no decision has yet been taken on its nature.
On this point, proposals have been made by par-
liaments or within them, which, not having yet
been finalised, are still subject to debate and
amendment during a process which will continue
until 1996 and beyond.
(i) The French proposals: the European senate
and int e rp arliame nt a ry c ommitt e e
48. In France, the Senate and the National
Assembly, through their delegations to the Euro-
pean Union, have put forward proposals for the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference
thai accord an important place to the question of
parliamentary supervision. These proposals were
set out in detail in three reports published in
December 1994 andFebruary 1995.
49. The Senate has published two reports " on
the preparation of the intergovernmental con-
ference which present the idea of creating, along-
side the European Parliament, a second European
parliamentary chamber which would allow natio-
nal parliaments closer participation in the Euro-
pean decision-making process. This " chamber of
national parliaments whose powers would be dif-
ferent to those of the European Parliament ...
would supplement the control exercised by the
latter with a control rooted in national political
life ".
50. Its powers " might relate first and foremost
to areas which fall outside the community deci-
sion-making process ... primarily the second and
third pillars of the Union ... Moreover, the second
chamber might exercise conffol over the principle
of subsidiariry a task not currently undertaken by
any of the institutions of the (Jnion .. "12.
5 1. As to its composition, o' the members of this
Assembly would sit in national delegations ...; in
this way its composition might be adjusted in
[1. Senate, Information reports 104, 2nd December 1994,
and 224, 15th February 1995.
12. Senate, Information report lM on the preparation ofthe
1996 intergovernmental conference, 2nd December 1994,
pages 4l-42.
accordance with the participation of states in the
various aspects of the intergovernmental pillars or
in related forms of co-operation between member
states. Thus the Assembly of WEU might become
one of the formations of the European Senate, the
one made up of parliamentary delegates of the
WEU member states ... o'13
52. " Its membership should, for reasons of
consistency, be determined in relation to the
weighting of voting within the Council: one
might, for example, envisage that the number of
members of the parliamentary delegation of a
state should be equal to double the number of
votes that state has in the Council; one would
thus, under present conditions, arrive at an assem-
bly of 174 members ... ".
53. This " European Senate o', the aim of which
would be to inroduce an element of parliamen-
tary supervision into areas of intergovernmental
co-operation and which would have a r61e distinct
from that of the European Parliament (limited to
supervision of the single 'o community " pillar)
" would be a simplification compared with the
present situation since it would be based on a
clear definition of the r6les of each one, while
today's institutional grey area between the second
and third pillars is a source of confusion of res-
ponsibilities and procedural conflicts "ro.
54. The delegation of the National Assembly to
the European Union has proposed the creation of
an " interparliamentary committee to ensure the
participation of national parliaments in the deci-
sion-making process of the Union "15. This com-
mittee " would be composed of a number of repre-
sentatives, that might be fixed between three and
six for each member state. States with bicameral
parliaments might share the seats between their
two assemblies in accordance with their own
constitutional system. This committee would thus
be a renewed version, with enhanced powers, of
the present Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (CEAC) ... ".
55. The committee would be competent to exa-
mine'o the major decisions of the European Union
and subjects which, by their nature, fell outside
the area of responsibility of the European Parlia-
ment: revision of treaties, international agree-
ments and enlargement of the Union, the budget
and in particular receipts, internal and judicial
affairs. The committee would also be the author-
ity for appropriate parliamentary supervision of
decisions relating to the restricted circles estab-
13. Senate, Information report224 on the reform ofthe insti-
tutions of the European Union (Vol. D, l5th February 1995,
page 39.
14. Idem, page 40.
15. National Assembly, Information report 1939 on institu-
tional reform of the European Union, 8th February 1995,
pages 99-100.
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lished for currency and defence matters. On all
these questions the committee would give consul-
tative opinions ".
(ii) The United Kingdom debate: strengthening
the rble of the nntional parliaments
56. In the United Kingdom, the preparation of
the intergovernmental conference and the policy
on an enlarged and reformed European Union
have been a source of extremely lively debate. An
important place is given to the question of parlia-
mentary supervision of decisions taken in the
Union, a question which the Prime Minister, Mr.
John Major, has undertaken to present to the
conference'6.
57. A consensus is emerging within the main
parliamentary groups in favour of a more active
presence by national parliaments in the European
process; there are divergences only as regards the
means, with most Conservatives advocating bet-
ter definition and a reduction of the powers of the
European Parliament in favour of national parlia-
ments, while Labour and the Liberal Democrats
generally advocate strengthening the powers of
the European Parliament within the limits impo-
sed by community legislation and closer co-
operation between the latter and national parlia-
ments ". The idea of a European second chamber,
representing national parliaments has also met
with a degree of support within the United King-
dom Parliament'8.
58. Parliamentary supervision was not devel-
oped in the United Kingdom Government's
memorandum on " the treatment of European
defence issues ", which confined itself to noting
the existence of the Assembly of WEU as the par-
liamentary component of European defence'e. But
the government is paying close attention to it as is
evident from a confidential information note by
the Foreign Secretary on the preparation of the
intergovernmental conference, extracts from
which have been published in the press2o.
59. This note states that: " building up a formal
r6le for national parliaments through treaty
amendment would not only be fraught with diffi-
culty but would tend to require inputs from parlia-
ments which are significantly more integrationist
than Westminster ". To deal with this difficulty,
the authors of this document propose " to tread
16. See in this connection the debate on the European Union;
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 255, No. 62, Col. 1063,
lst March 1995.
17. See for example the debate on the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference; Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 562, No. 53,
col. 272-357, 8th March 1995.
18. Idem, col293.
19. WEU Assembly; AflVEU/DG (95)9,paee7.
20. The Times, 9th March 1995.
carefully in this area, avoiding treaty amendments
wherever possible in favour of practical steps
designed to enable the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment to enhance its r6le in European affairs. "
This text also addresses a question of prime
importance, that of the effectiveness of European
parliamentary supervision exercised by national
parliaments, observing that: " Despite a general
wish to bring national parliaments into the frame,
it seems highly doubtful whether the involvement
of 15 parliaments in testing subsidiarity would in
practice lead to a more positive outcome in indivi-
dual cases. "
60. The United Kingdom Government's propo-
sals on European defence in the memorandum
submitted to Parliament by the Prime Minister on
lst March are the subject of continuing debate and
scrutiny in both Houses of Parliament; select
committees in both the House of Commons and
the House of Lords are currently examining issues
which may be raised at the intergovernmental
conference, including links between the EU and
WEU.
61. In July 1995, the European Legislation
Committee of the House of Commons issued a
report on the prospects for the intergovernmental
conference. It surveyed the wide agenda facing
the conference and it was highly critical of the
current processes for examining European legisla-
tion and the failure to translate into effective
action the declarations accompanying the Maas-
tricht Treaty on relations with national parlia-
ments; it proposed specific changes in this area to
be placed on the agenda for the intergovernmental
conference. The report also made proposals for
strengthening the r6le of national parliaments,
arguing for further consideration of the case for a
second chamber and airing the possibility of
giving national parliaments a formal r6le in the
European legislative process.
62. The future of WEU in the light of the inter-
governmental conference was the subject of dis-
cussion in the House of Commons during the
annual debate on the defence estimates, on Mon-
day l6th October 1995. Mr. Michael Portillo,
Secretary of State for Defence, reaffirmed the Bri-
tish Government's wish to see the operational
capabilities of WEU developed, but expressed the
hope that the debate on defence at the inter-
governmental conference would not get side-
tracked into " theological debate o'. The British
Government could not accept a merger of WEU
into the European Union; the EU included coun-
tries that were neutral and it would be positively
damaging to Europe's wider interests to put in
place new defence hurdles for prospective EU
members in Central and Eastern Europe.
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(iii) The German debate: the Lamers-Schtiuble
document2'
63. In September 1994, the CDU/CSU parlia-
mentary group published a document: Thoughts
on the European Union in the framework of pre-
parations for the parliamentary elections to be
held in November of the same year. This docu-
ment had repercussions beyond Germany's bor-
ders on account of its proposal for a multi-speed
Europe, built around a central core of five or six
countries, hinged upon France and Germany.
Taking what might be described as a " pro-inte-
gration " stance, this text, in addition to its argu-
ments in favour of the " hard core oo approach,
deserves credit for highlighting certain short-
comings from which the European Union suffers,
especially in relation to the common foreign and
security policy.
64. These " thoughts " do not represent the
views of the Bundestag, but probably provide a
reference in the discussions in the German Parlia-
ment concerning the preparation of the inter-
governmental conference. According to the
authors of the text, the European process has rea-
ched a critical stage in its development as a result
of its institutions becoming overextended (enlarge-
ment of the European Union), the growing diver-
gence of interests of the member countries, differ-
ing perceptions of priorities (the Mediterranean,
Central and Eastern Europe), economic changes
and their social consequences, a strengthening of
nationalist tendencies and nations looking inwards(out of fear of migration) and the weakness of
governments and national partaments in remedying
problems that extend beyond the national frame-
work.
65. Several proposals for dealing with this situa-
tion have been made concerning the institutional
development of the Union, strengthening the
" hard core " (composed of five or six countries
involved in a process of advanced currency and
political integration), deepening Franco-German
relations, strengthening the Union's ability to act
in foreign policy and security maffers and exten-
ding the Union to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. In the institutional sphere, the
document suggests drawing on the federal model,
with clear demarcation of responsibilities at Euro-
pean, national and regional levels. The power
structure revolves, as is presently the case, around
the Council of the Union, the Commission and the
European Parliament, but the Council and the Par-
liament would share the legislative function, with
the frst acting as a second chamber (the Chamber
of States), while the Commission would have the
duties of a " European Government'0.
21. Bulletin Europe (Documents) No. 1895/96, 7th Septem-
ber 1994.
66. This structure, intended in principle to make
the Union function more efficiently, nevertheless
leaves national parliaments out of the European
process, as their power of supervision would apply
only indirectly through the Chamber of States (the
present Council of the Union), being exercised, a
priori, uniquely over the national government,
while decisions are taken in a community or inter-
governmental framework and are binding on
governments in respect of their partners. That is
one of the weaknesses of this document, which
will have to be revised, as it leads to marginalisa-
tion of the only political representation available
to the peoples of the member countries of the
Union, the source of each state's sovereignty,
including that of Germany, even if the authors
attribute " in parallel, not as a priority ... prime
importance to the participation of national parlia-
ments in creating political will in Europe " 22.
67. During its working visit to the Bundestag in
March 1995, the Assembly's Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations was able to gain
an impression of the state of the discussions being
held in the German parliament on the intergovern-
mental conference. For Mrs. Rita Siissmuth, Pre-
sident of the Bundestag, there would be no sense
in WEU remaining outside community sffuctures:
even if a merger were not immediate, it should at
least be effective when the modified Brussels
Treaty became due for review in 1998. In terms of
parliamentary supervision, she believed it would
first be necessary to strengthen the responsibili
ties of the European Parliament instead of crea-
ting new parliamentary structures 
- 
such as a
second chamber of the European Parliament.
68. A draft resolution of the Bundesrat on the
preparation of the 1996 conference follows simi-
lar lines by proposing better definition of the areas
of responsibility of the Union, its institutions and
the member states and bringing the second
(CFSP) and third (Justice) pillars of intergovern-
mental co-operation into the community. Accor-
ding to this text, the European Parliament should
have greater powers of co-decision alongside the
Council and the number of topics requiring a qua-
lified majority or unanimous vote in the Council
should be reduced. The document furthermore
specifies that national parliaments and the Euro-
pean Parliament should co-operate closely in pre-
paring the Conference and implementing the
results r.
(iv) Belgium and the 1996 intergovernmental
conference
69. The committee for opinion responsible for
European questions in Belgium's Chamber of
22.Idem, page 5.
23. Bundesrat, Antrag der Liinder Bayern und Meinland-
Pfalz, Drucksache 169195, 24th March 1995.
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Deputies has published an interim report on the
issue2a according to which the conference should
have a two-fold objective: " develop a medium
and long-term political prograrnme for all areas
for which the European Union could and should
assume responsibility ...; make the required
amendments to the treaty in areas where this
should prove necessary, particularly for institu-
tional reasons ... . In any event, any institutional
reform should have a purpose, namely to permit
enlargement through deepening ". The institu-
tional reform of the Union is, according to the
authors, the primary condition for completing the
process of accession of new members and the
introduction of monetary union is, in their view, a
major requirement, since it is probably the only
real lever for achieving a deepening.
70. The interim report also advocates establish-
ing a procedure for voluntary withdrawal or
exclusion of a member state and the rejection of a
" Europe d la carte " where " each member state
would decide independently which component of
European policy it intended to implement ". Here
too, the " hard core o' theory receives a less than
enthusiastic welcome and a multi-speed Europe
within which the pace of integration would not be
identical for the various member states is accep-
table as a temporary interim solution...; it cannot
become an end in itself. Indeed, the concept of a
federal Europe with strong community institu-
tions like the Commission and the Parliament
would seem to be preferred by the Rapporteurs.
71. The CFSP should be the sole responsibility
of the community institutions and decisions in this
area would be taken by qualified majority. Propo-
sals regarding WEU are more tentative since the
Rapporteurs admit that " it is in principle desi-
rable for WEU to be integrated into the European
Union ". At the same time they advocate " WEIJ's
organic involvement in NATO.It is necessary too
for European Union members also to join WEU
and to be members of NATO... Consequently any
form of detachment is to be avoided and the Euro-
pean Union should defend Atlantic solidarity in a
convincing manner. Moreover the Rapporteurs
consider it desirable for COREPER- to be asso-
ciated with the working of WEU: states might
replace their ambassadors to WEU by their per-
manent representative to the European Union. As
to the WEU Assembly, the Rapporteurs wonder
whether it should not be composed of members of
the European Parliament, an idea which concords
with the resolutions adopted by the latter in this
connection.
24. Chanber of Deputies of Belgium, interim report on the
I 996 intergovernmental conference: Rapporteurs, MM. Eys-
kens and Willockx; No. 1783/1 - 94195,30th March 1995.
25. Committee of permanent representatives of member
states.
72. With regard to parliamentary supervision,
the idea of a European Senate composed of dele-
gations of national parliaments is rejected in
favour of establishing a body for contacts and
consultation between national parliaments. This
converges with the proposal of the French Senate
Delegation to the European Parliament which
advocates the creation of an interparliamentary
committee or strengthening the responsibilities of
the CEAC. The number of European parliamenta-
rians would be reduced but the European Parlia-
ment's powers of co-decision would be extended.
This interim report opts firmly in favour of streng-
thening community structures and the European
Parliament as opposed to aftempts to renationalise
European policy and resorting too much to inter-
governmental procedures.
73. After the reconstitution of the chambers fol-
lowing the parliamentary elections of 2lst May
1995, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
decided to create a joint body with responsibility
for examining questions relating to the European
Union. This federal consultative committee res-
ponsible for European questions, composed of 10
members of the Chamber of Deputies, 10 senators
and 10 Belgian members of the European Parlia-
ment, is to prepare a memorandum on the inter-
governmental conference based on the report by
Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Wilockx. In the context of
these discussions, on 26th September 1995, the
committee met the two members of the European
Parliament in the European Union Reflection
Group, Mrs. Guigou and Mr. Brok. On 25th Octo-
ber 1995, the committee pubtshed a second inter-
im report 26 to be submitted for the opinion of
social representatives (employers, trades unions,
universities, non-governmental organisations and
the press), on the occasion of a hearing to be held
on 25th November 1995. Furthermore, many
amendments have been tabled by members of the
Committee for an opinion and are now being exa-
mined. In early December the committee is to
finalise the text of its motion which will then be
discussed in plenary session by both the Chamber
and the Senate, with a view to reaching a common
position on the intergovernmental conference prior
to its opening. The committee will then continue to
monitor the progress of negotiations and may, if
necessary, propose that the two chambers again
take a position in the discussion. No decision has
yet been taken on the procedure to be followed
during the final stage of the intergovernmental
conference, when parliament will have examined
the draft treaty resulting from the negotiations.
26. Chamber of Deputies of Belgium and Senate; the 1996
intergovernmental conference; second interim report on
behalf of the Committee for an opinion on European ques-
tions of the Chamber and of the Senate; Rapporteurs: MM.
Eyskens, Hatry and Wilockx, No. 190/1 - 95196 (Chamber),
l-l40ll (Senate), 25th October 1995. The three co-Rappor-
teurs represent the Chamber, Senate and Belgian Delegation
to the European Parliament respectively.
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74. This second interim report takes up the main
lines already set out in the first text but goes into
greatff detail on the aims to be achieved. In regard
to the CFSR the Rapporteurs make four propo-
sals:
(i) to achteve an efficient common foreign
and security policy, the Council will
have to decide on joint action without
the unanimity of the states being requi-
red for this purpose;
(ii) the strengthening of the CFSP also
means that the European Parliament
should be able to exercise democratic
supervision over the decisions of the
European Council and the working of
the European Corps;
(iii) the integration of Western European
Union (WEU) into the European Union
should be pursued. For that reason, it
would be desirable for the committee of
permanent representatives to be associa-
ted with the working of WEU;
(iv) finally, the common defence policy
should then be transformed into a true
Community policy while maintaining
structural synergy with NATO'z?.
Concerning the r6le of national parliaments in the
working of the European Union, it is proposed
that this be included in the text of the Treaty on
the Union.
(v) Italy and the preparation of the intergovern-
mental conference
75. The intergovernmental conference is of par-
ticular importance to Italy, since that country
ensures the presidency of the Union during the
flrst half of 1996. On 23rd and 24th May 1995,
debates were held in the Chamber of Deputies and
the Senate on the Italian Government's proposals
for preparing the 1996 conference. Following
these discussions, several resolutions 2t were
adopted expressing the position of Italian parlia-
mentarians.
The commonforeign and security policy (CFSP)
76. ln three resolutions adopted by the members
of the Chamber of Deputies on 23rd May 1995,
the government is asked to act with a view to
affirming a European defence identity, strengthen-
ing the action of the Union in the area of common
foreign and security policy so as to increase
Europe's r6le in the world. The aims to be
achieved in the CFSP are defined as being2e:
27.Idem, page 6.
28. Camera dei Deputati; Documenti esaminati nel corso
della seduta.o*ngalsnzioni all'Assemblea; No. 186, alle-
gato A, Z3rdMay 1995.
29.ldem,page 4468.
t4
- 
integration of the common trade policy
and of the policy of co-operation and of
development;
- 
implementation of a pennanent sftategy of
the Union and of member counEies in the
United Nations and other international
organisations with a view to reforming
them and making them more efficient;
- 
the full inclusion of the CFSP in the Com-
munity system with affirmation of the r61e
of the European Commission in its defini-
tion including in the field of common
defence;
- 
implementation of joint action and deve-
lopment of means of intervention to main-
tain peace and re-establish law and order
at international level;
- 
preparation for the progressive integration
of WEU into the European Union;
- 
creation of a planning and common analy-
sis centre in the European Council and the
Commission.
With regard to the national parliaments, the par-
liamentarians were in favour of greater participa-
tion in defining and monitoring decisions of the
Union with a view to greater co-operation with
the European Parliament and rejected the idea of a
third Chamber (European Senate) regrouping the
national assemblies.
77. In its turn, the Senate adopted two resolu-
tionss on24th May 1995 taking up the main lines
of those adopted by the Chamber, asking the
government to strengthen the Union's means of
action in CFSP matters, including the creation of
new, more adequate procedures to take into
account the economic weight of the Union in the
world with a view to progressively affirming a
European defence identity.
(vi) The Portuguese Parliament and " positive
variable geometry "
78. In a report published in March 1995 entitled
" Parliamentary follow-up to the revision of the
Treaty on European Union in the 1996 inter-
governmental conference "3r, the European Affairs
Committee presents five principles, reflecting
Pornrgal's views, to be taken into consideration in
the revision of the Maastricht Treaty:
- ffirmation and recognition of the r6le of
the Portuguese language, spoken by over
200 million people throughout the world;
30. Senato della Repubblica 168 seduta pubblica, resoconto
stenogralrco, page 58, 24thMay 1995.
31. Acompanhamento parlamentar da revisEo do tratado da
Uni6o Europeia na Confer€ncia intergovemmental de 1996;
Commiss6o de Assuntos Europeus, Lisbon 1995.
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- 
respect for the principle of equality bet-
ween member states without ruling out the
idea of a European 'o central core ", revi-
sion of the treaty to be achieved unani-
mously:
- 
strengthening the r6le of the national par-
liaments and intensification of their co-
operation with the European Parliament,
especially through CEAC;
- 
maintaining economic and social cohesion
as a structural instrument for deepening
and widening the Union;
- 
analysis of the cases of application of the
principle of " positive variable geometry "
based on the will and possibilities of each
member state.
79. Concerning parliamentary supervision, the
aim of which is to ensure the democratic legitim-
acy of the European process by bringing Europe
and its citizens closer together by means of elec-
ted assemblies, the committee declares itself in
favour of strengthening supervisory powers
within states and increased co-operation between
national parliaments, particularly through struc-
tures such as CEAC, which might possibly be
asked to prepare future conferences of the parlia-
ments.
80. In European security and defence matters,
Portuguese parliamentarians consider that the
development of the CFSP implies realisation of
the urgency for the Union to assume a central r6le
in international stability and security, including
recourse to military means. To avoid bottlenecks
in the decision-making process, decision-making
mechanisms must be reviewed and an opt-out
clause added. As to WEU, clarification of its r6le
and relations with the European Union and NATO
is essential and it is also necessary to identify the
military means available to it and clarify ques-
tions of command or hierarchical responsibility.
(vii) The Greek proposals
81. On l2th,13th and 14th October 1995, the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions of the Assembly of WEU became the frst
committee of the Assembly to visit the Greek Par-
liament since Greece's accession to WEU. During
this visit the committee had talks with the parlia-
mentary European Affairs Committee and the
Minister for European Affairs which allowed it to
learn of Greece's proposals for the intergovern-
mental conference. Like the Belgian federal
consultative committee, the European Affairs
Committee also includes Greek members of the
European Parliament, confibuting to better under-
standing ofthe positions expressed at national and
European parliamentary level. The Greek parlia-
mentarians handed the committee their report32 on
the question prepared in July 1995.
Commonforeign and security policy (CFSP)
82. For Greek parliamentarians, oothe develop-
ment of a true common foreign policy and defence
policy is a constituent element of the creation of
an international legal entity of the European
Union. But also, the assignation for that purpose
of the sovereign rights of the member states,
without strict specifications and guarantees,
would constitute the assignation of constituent
elements of state sovereignty and national inde-
pendence and would aim at the creation of a direc-
torate of the most powerful states '0. To avoid this
situation, it will be necessary to respect the follow-
ing conditions:
-recognition, respect and guarantee of the
external frontiers of the Union in the broad
meaning of the term, including not only
the territory and the territorial waters, but
also the economic and fishing zone, as
they are defined in the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which must be included in
the legal unified order;
-recognition, respect and guarantee ofinternational law and international
conventions, which, together with the
Charter of the United Nations and OSCE
agreements, must constitute a united legal
basis for the CFSP;
- 
recognition and declaration of the right or
obligation of mutual assistance clauses,
according to the provisions of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty33 ;
- 
absorption of WEU by the European
Union and materialisation of the future
development of a common defence indus-
try.
The European Affairs Commiuee also advocates
strengthening the veto right of states when it is
deemed that a suggested common policy is not in
conformity with the institutional parameters of
the CFSP and on matters directly affecting their
national interests.
32. European Union intergovernmental conference 1996;
Deliberations, problems, positions and suggestions formula-
ted in the European Affairs Committee; Athens, July 1995,
pages 5-22.
33. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty states that " If
any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an
armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties
will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all
the military and other aid and assistance in their power. " On
the accession of Greece, the parties to the treaty agreed that
this article would not be applied in the event of hostilities bet-
ween member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.
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R6le of national parliaments
83. The committee's report considers that the
strengthening of the r6le of national parliaments
constitutes a necessary precondition for the demo-
cratisation of the Union, but also for the participa-
tion of citizens not only in the unification proce-
dure, but also in the Union's operation. The
participation of the national parliaments must be
institutionally fortifred by the new convention and
the following must be provided:
- 
institutional obligation of the [European]
Commission for continuous and complete
updating of the parliaments about any acti-
vity it undertakes;
- 
definite peremptory for the approval of
any activity which constitutes concession
of a sovereign right;
- 
definite peremptory for the ascertainment
of the preconditions for the application of
the principles of subsidiarity and its appli-
cation, and an independent right for their
appeal before the European Court, when
the above principle is violated.
The relation of co-operation between national and
European parliaments must be developed more
systematically, especially co-operation between
their committees. The European Parliament must
become a partner equivalent to the Council in the
legislative procedure of the European Union. The
Council of Ministers could be developed into a
Senate.
84. The proposals and current debates in the
national parliaments give a insight into the pos-
sible options for parliamentary supervision of
European decisions, be it by establishing a second
European parliamentary chamber representative
of national parliaments, or by strengthening at
national level the powers of parliaments over the
European policies of governments or again by a
transfer of legislative powers from the Council of
the Union to the European Parliament. Opinions
on the subject are not confined to the cases men-
tioned and the thinking in progress in other natio-
nal parliaments will further contribute to these
questions along lines which, depending on natio-
nal traditions, will be based on one or other of the
views expressed. At the same time, introduction
of the parliamentary dimension into the European
context is also achieved through development of
interparliamentary co-operation.
(b) Earopean interparliamentary co-operatian
85. The national parliaments of the member
countries of the European Union and WEU parti-
cipate in the community process to varying
extents. However, one cannot help but note that
this participation remains largely beyond their
reach and is frequently confined to discussion and
approval of legislation and community decisions
ratified by the Council of Ministers of the Union.
86. In relation to the CFSP, for example, Title V
of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference
whatsoever to the rdle of national parliaments, but
does mention that of the European Parliament.
Once aware of the situation, national parliaments
responded by stepping up interparliamentary co-
operation in order to face up to the implications of
Maastricht and have their say at the intergovern-
mental conference. This co-operation is being
developed for the main part within the CEAC and
the Conference of Speakers.
(i) CEAC 
- 
Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees
87. CEAC held its first meeting in November
1989 and has since met half-yearly to discuss sub-
jects which fall within the European Union's areas
of responsibility; it is composed of national and
European parliamentarians. Meetings are held in
the country of the presidency of the Council of the
Union, thus enabling parliamentarians to be infor-
med of the programme of the current presidency
and to make their views known.
88. From the time the Maastricht Treaty took
effect and since the initial development of the
CFSP, CEAC has been used to clarifu the r6le of
national parliaments in this area, as noted in the
conclusions adopted at the VIIIth Conference 3o
held in Copenhagen on 4th and 5th May 1993.
According to these conclusions, participants
agreed that parliamentary supervision of inter-
governmental co-operation was most important,
despite the fact that such co-operation did not fall
within the sphere of the Community.
89. For them to exercise this supervision in full,
national parliaments need to be informed by
governments, the Council of Ministers and the
Commission about decisions to be taken, within a
time-frame allowing them to discuss matters in
full possession of the facts. This is far from
always being the case, as current procedure in the
majority of countries frequently limits the powers
of national parliaments in this respect even if in
certain cases they express the wish to intervene
over and above the community decision-making
process.
90. It was in part this question that the Xth
conference sought to answer at its meeting in
Athens on 9th and 10th May 1994 which dealt
mainly with the democratic deficit and transpar-
ency in the decision-making process 3'. The dis-
34. National Assembly (France), Information report No. 143
(amended), 5th May 1993, page 15.
35. National Assembly (France), Information report
No. 1237, l7thMay 1994.
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cussions provided an opportunity to emphasise
that if there was a perceived democratic deficit
this was largely because governments were not
sufficiently answerable to their national parlia-
ments 36. This facet of the problem is sometimes
neglected when discussing the powers of national
parliaments in European policy matters.
91. In the area of the CFSP, this weakness might
become even more acute because of the growing
trend for the executive to treat such questions as
confidential, indeed, to shroud them in official
secrecy. The contradiction here between official
speeches to national parliaments calling for fur-
ther commitment to the European process and the
unwillingness of the Council of Ministers of the
European Union to authorise publication of docu-
ments drafted by the Council and its committees
during the preparation of Council decisions on
European Union " legislation is all too evident.
CEAC, aware of the need to resolve these issues,
included an item on the r01e of national parlia-
ments in the institutional development of the
European Union3'in the agenda of its XIIth meet-
ing on 27th and 28th February 1995.
92. At the XIIth conference and in the debate on
the r0le of national parliaments in the European
Union and their participation in the preparatory
work for the intergovernmental conference, the
French proposal for the creation ofa second Euro-
pean chamber and associating national parlia-
ments more closely with the group of experts pre-
paring the intergovernmental conference met with
little response ". The Luxembourg representation
opted for maintaining the half-yearly conferences
and making them more effective4, partly concur-
ring with the French National Assembly delega-
tion proposal for creating an interparliamentary
committeeor.
93. The Danish Delegation adopted a position in
favour of clear demarcation between European,
national and regional areas of responsibility.
Spain and Belgium stated they were in favour of
strengthening the supervision exercised by their
parliaments over national European policieso' 
- 
a
36. Idem, page 13.
37. Netherlands draft motion on transparency; National
Assembly (France), Information report No. 1237,l7thMay
1994, Appendix 3, page 53.
38. National Assembly (France), Information report
No. 1660, 15th November 1994, page 37.
39. Chamber of Deputies and Senate of Belgium: report on the
conference of Conference of European Affairs Committees(CEAC XII), Paris, 27th and 28th February 1995;
No. 1769ll - 94195 and 1369-l (199+1995), 24thMarch 1995.
40. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Chamber of Deputies,
extract from proceedings No. 5/94-95, page7.
41. French National Assembly, Information Report No. 1939
on institutional reform of the European Union, 8th February
1995, pages 99-100.
42. Iz Monde,2nd March 1995, page 4.
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sensitive issue as it is closely linked to the func-
tioning of the institutions and political radition of
individual countries, which does not encourage a
harmonisation of procedures in this area between
parliaments. These institutional differences also
explain in part the informal r6le of the Conference
of Speakers of National Parliaments of the Euro-
pean Union. The participants agreed to pursue the
debate on the preparation of the intergovern-
mental conference at the next CEAC meeting
which is to be held in Madrid in the second half of
1995.
(ii) The Conference of Speakers of National Par-
liaments
94. A more informal body, the Conference of
Speakers of National Parliaments (which also
includes the European Parliament) has met on
average once every two years, since 1975. It
groups speakers with different statuses, some
having a more political than procedural r6le, and
allows exchanges of views on such questions as
parliamentary supervision, links between parlia-
ments and electors, the media and power and
other related questions 43.
95. The participation of national parliaments in
the reform of European institutions as envisaged
after 1996 was a central issue in the discussions
during an informal meeting of speakers in Bonn
on l2th September 1994, when members set
themselves two major goals: to participate to the
greatest extent possible in discussions on the
reform of the European institutions before deci-
sions were reached at the 1996 intergovernmental
conference and to work together to ensure
national parliaments took a leading r6le. At that
meeting it was proposed to set up a small working
group to prepare a conference of national parlia-
ments for the second half of 1995, in order to
assert their views before decisions are taken in
1996*.
96. CEAC and the Conference are two mecha-
nisms for dialogue and exchange of interparlia-
mentary views, but they are a long way from co-
ordinating national parliaments' attitudes to
Community-related questions. For the CFSP and
European defence, no sffuctures yet exist for bring-
ing together defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees of national parliaments and this shortcoming
is one the WEU Assembly should take upon itself
to rectify. In the meantime, European parliamen-
tary institutions such as the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe, the European
Parliament and the WEU Assembly are endea-
vouring, each in its own way, to inffoduce a real
parliamentary dimension into this debate.
43. See for example Conference of Speakers of the European
parliamentary assemblies 
- 
Summary report, The Hague,
24thand 25th June 1994 (Netherlands Parliament edition).
44. Le Monde, l3th September 1994.
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(c) The r6le of European pailiamentary instilutions
97. European security and defence remain
essentially within the area of intergovernmental
co-operation, despite mention here and there of a
European anny or a European defence policy. In
point of fact, leaving aside the speeches and
declarations of principle, there is a European
defence which, although not integrated, is ensured
in an intergovernmental framework by WEU, and
a Euro-Atlantic defence which, through NATO,
has an integrated command structure, but which is
not supranational.
98. Both these organisations have a more or less
well-defined collective defence r6le (see the fifth
article of their respective treaties). The fact
remains, however, that there are no forces penna-
nently assigned to WEU, nor is there a single
command. Member states decide, case by case,
the possible contribution they will make to anyjoint action, on the basis of national criteria.
99. In the framework of the CFSP and the defi-
nition of a common defence policy, it will be
necessary, if we are to have a credible instrument
at our disposal, for our respective defence policies
to be made more " European " by pursuing the
harmonisation of personnel, equipment and cur-
rent military doctrine. These are difficult steps,
touching as they do upon one of the principal
attributes of state sovereignty: national defence.
For to succeed, states must be agreed on such a
development and public opinion and national par-
liaments must also support it. This also presup-
poses a common vision of the problems stretching
beyond mere national considerations. It is in this
area that the WEU Assembly can best contribute
to establishing a European security and defence
policy.
(i) The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe
100. At its plenary session in September 1995,
the Assembly adopted a resolution and a recom-
mendation on the intergovernmental conference.
These two documentsas were adopted on the basis
of three reports submitted by different commit-
teeso one of which, from the Political Affairs
Committee, was presented by Mr. Masseret, who
is also the Chairman of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations of the WEU Assem-
bly. Resolution 1067 on the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference of the European Union is
mainly addressed to the European Parliament
with a view to intensi$ing co-operation between
the t'wo institutions, considering that " the Euro-
pean Union and the Council of Europe had the
common task of setting out guidelines for Euro-
45. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Recommendati on 127 9, Resolution 1067, 199 5 session, 27th
September 1995.
pean construction, which is achieved as much by
intergovernmental co-operation as by integtation "
and that " the European Parliament and the Parlia-
mentary Asserhbly of the Council of Europe are
the European institutions stemming from univer-
sal suffrage, which are best placed to meet the
democratic demands of the people of Europe ".
Recommendatton 1279 on the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference of the European Union asked
the Council of Ministers to " propose a revision of
Article 2306 of the Treaty of Rome, so that the
European Community recognises therein the
Council of Europe's achievements and r6le in res-
pect of the definition of the rule of law and the
monitoring of legal and democratic standards of
the pan-European society, and inclusion of mem-
bership of the Council of Europe as a condition
for accession to the European Union " and, a deli-
cate matter since this is not the direct responsibil-
ity of that organisation, to " propose to the Euro-
pean Union the establishment of appropriate links
between its own political dialogue and the com-
mon foreign and security policy, including co-
operation at secretariat level ".
(ii) The European Parliament
101. The European Parliament, elected by uni-
versal suffrage in a manner specific to each mem-
ber counbry ofthe Union, has experienced a quali-
tative enhancement of its r6le through the entry
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. It now has
very real powers in implementing the CFSP, des-
pite difficulties in their application, and would
wish to see them extended.
102. Article J.7 of Title V of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union gives the parliament specific powers
in relation to the CFSP:
-oo The Presidency shall consult the Euro-
pean Parliament on the main aspects and
the basic choices of the common foreign
and security policy and shall ensure that
the views of the European Parliament are
duly taken into consideration. The Euro-
pean Parliament should be kept regularly
informed by the Presidency and the Com-
mission of the development of the Union's
foreign and security policy.
- 
The European Parliament may ask ques-
tions of the Council or make recommenda-
tions to it. It shall hold an annual debate on
implementing the common foreign and
securiry policy. "
103. Additionally, the European Parliament is
sending two representatives to participate in the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference,
whereas national parliaments and the WEU
18
46. Article 230 of the Rome Treaty provides that " the Com-
munity shall establish all appropriate forms of co-operation
with the Council of Europe. "
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Assembly, which wish to make a contribution and
be present at the negotiating table, are having dif-
ficulty in this respect, although they will be called
upon subsequently to ratify the results4T.
104. The European Parliament lost no time in
seizing the oppornrnity to afnrm its prerogatives
and, since 1993, has worked on the CFSP at the
expense in particular of those who might be part-
ners and help to strengthen parliamentary supervi-
sion of intergovernmental initiatives in these
questions, namely the national parliaments and
the WEU Assembly. One of the aims of the Euro-
pean Parliament is to acquire prerogatives in
supervising the CFSP budget, which it does not at
present possess. Its ability to take action is never-
theless real, as Turkey discovered in discussions
held in February 1995 on its proposed customs
union with the European Union which in no way
detracted from the difficulties encountered in
what were already sensitive negotiationsa.
105. In security and defence matters, the Euro-
pean Parliament is proposing the gradual replace-
ment of intergovernmental by community proce-
dures, the absorption of WEU by the European
Union, the submission of military operations deci-
ded by WEU to authorisation from the European
Parliament and the intensification of co-operation
with the WEU Assembly, the latter eventually
being replaced by the European Parliamentae. At
the same time it is calling for more systematic
democratic control of the decisions of the Euro-
pean Union, in association with the national par-
Iiaments. To this end, it is proposed, in a docu-
ment by the Institutional Committee on the
Development of the Union, to include directly in
the Treaty on European Union a revised version of
Declaration 13 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty
on the r6le of national parliaments, urging
governments to allow sufficient time to enable
them to decide on the new European Union legis-
lation without unduly delaying the decision-
making process.50
106. The text also proposes that national parlia-
ments be more closely associated with the annual
legislative prograrnme and, with the intergovern-
mental conference in view, asks for a consultative
conference of parliaments to be convened, which
might be held at the start and end of the conferen-
41. Apan from the WEU Assembly which has only a consul-
tative 16le.
48. Greece was opposed to signing the agreement with Tur-
key as long as the Union failed to give firm undertakings
regarding the future accession of Cyprus.
49. European Parliament: Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Security and Defence Policy; sub-committee on security and
disarmament; PE 21 1.388, l9th December 1994, pages 3-4.
50. European Parliament: Committee on Institutional
Affairs; draft report on the development of the European
Union; part A: draft resolution; Rapporteur Mr. David Mar-
tin;PB211.919/A, 16th March 1995, pages 7-8.
cesr. These approaches to national parliaments are
nevertheless set in the context of a prospective
increase in the European Parliament's powers,
making it the mainspring of parliamentary super-
vision in Europe.
107. This aim is set out clearly in another draft
report of the Institutional Committee, adopted in
May 1995, which states, in reference to parlia-
mentary supervision:
" The foreseeable emergence of restricted
circles of integration in the areas of mone-
tary union, WEU orthe Schengen areaposes
a serious threat to the very existence ofpar-
liamentary control. Whenever Union poli-
cies are pursued within a specific institutio-
nal framework and for a period of several
years by a restricted number of member
states, it is therefore vital to set up an ad hoc
body to exercise parliamentary control. Such
ad hoc bodies which would have to be res-
tricted in size and composed exclusively of
members of the European Parliament from
the member states concerned, could be
administered by the secretariat of the Euro-
pean Parliament, which would thus play a
pivotal r0le in a genuine European system of
parliamentary control (ESPC)" ".
108. These proposals are an accurate reflection of
the European Parliament's wish to increase its
prerogatives at all levels of operation and in all
areas of responsibility of the European Union. In
security and defence matters, the present inter-
governmental character of the CFSP prevents it
from exercising close supervision of Council ini-
tiatives, hence the demand for the second pillar of
the Union to be brought into the community and
for the integration of WEU in the structures of the
latter. This is a sensitive subject affecting both the
prerogatives of states and national parliaments
and those of the WEU Assembly, which is the
only European parliamentary institution wholly
concerned with security and defence questions.
(iii) The Western European Union Assembly
109. The WEU Assembly remains an institution
apart, as the only European parliamentary body
with acknowledged ffeaty powers in security and
defence matters. Article D( of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty states that " the Council of Western
European Union shall make an annual report on
its activities and in particular concerning the
control of armaments to an Assembly composed
51. Idem, page 13.
52. European Parliament: Committee on Institutional
Affairs; draft report on the operation ofthe Treary on Euro-
pean Union with a view to the 1996 intergovemmental con-
ference 
- 
implementation, Part A: Motion for a resolution;
Rapporteur Mr. Jean-Louis Bourlanges; PE 211.920lA, lOth
April 1995, page 14.
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of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers
to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe ".
110. Over the years, the Assembly has widened
its areas of responsibility to all major areas rela-
ting to security and defence. However, it shared
WEU's relatively low profile throughout most of
the cold war years, despite its recommendations
asking the Council to shoulder its responsibilities
more effectively.
111. The Maastricht Treaty and the implementa-
tion of the decisions on the CFSP mean that the
Assembly must define and assert its rightful place
within the new structures of Europe. For, although
its responsibilities are not called in question, its
sphere of action must be shared with other institu-
tions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and the
European Parliament.
ll2. T\e Assembly is the European forum where
national parliamentarians can air their points of
view and ideas, thus conributing to the emergence
of a European parliamentary identity in security
and defence matters. In this context, in Paris, in
October 1994,the Assembly brought together the
chairmen of defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees of all the member countries of WEU, irres-
pective of status. These initiatives, together with
its recommendations to the Council of Ministers,
allow the Assembly to take a position in the debate
forming the prelude to the intergovernmental
conference, although it is to be regretted that the
Council has not responded to the Assembly's
request to take part in the work of the wEU
" think tank " responsible for preparing the organ-
isation's contribution to the conference.
113. This situation has implications for relations
with the European Parliament, as proposals have
been made for the latter to absorb the Assembly,
although the modified Brussels Treaty is still in
force and will very likely remain so after 199853,
as the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley
Smith, stated at the opening of the Paris colloquy.
It is logical and desirable for the Assembly, as an
integral part of WEU, to be asked to be involved
in revising the declaration adopted by the minis-
ters at Maastricht. At the same time it is necessary
to consider the reforms that will be necessary to
enable it to play its full part as the parliamentary
component of the sole European defence organi-
safion.
114. This is no easy matter given the uncertainty
over the future of WEU, whose existence is not
threatened, but whose future nature and relations
53. The WEU Council of Ministers takes a different view to
the Assembly and believes the fifty-year time limit under
Article KI of the modified Brussels Treaty starts in 1948 and
not 1954.
with the European Union are as yet unknown. In
this area, the intentions of governments differ and
only the United Kingdom Government has openly
taken a position on the question in its memoran-
dum, by asserting its preference for intergovern-
mental co-operation in relation to the CFSP and
the European defence policy and stating that
WEU should remain separate from the European
Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ger-
many, Mr. Klaus Kinkelsa, and the Netherlands
Governments'have for their part stated they are in
favour of the integration of WEU in the European
Union. The 1998 deadline also holds uncertainty
as it is not known whether the modified Brussels
Treaty will be maintained in its present form or
possibly revised.
115. In any event, one of the problems to which a
solution will have to be found in the medium term
. 
is that of national representation in the Assembly,
which is at present the same as the parliamentary
delegations to the Council of Europe. In the event
of the modified Brussels Treaty being revised, it
might be desirable for the composition of the
Assembly to reflect that of the defence and possi-
bly also foreign and European affairs committees
of the national parliaments. Links with the delega-
tions to the North Atlantic Assembly should also
be sought in order to ensure a corlmon parliamen-
tary representation of the European pillar of the
alliance in that institution.
116. Nor is the present consultative r6le of the
Assembly entirely adequate to ensure parliamen-
tary supervision with the participation of national
parliaments in decisions concerning European
security and defence. The possibility of giving
consultative opinions on decisions already taken
or to be taken in future by the WEU Council
would be a political factor of greater impact than
the present procedure of recommendations to the
Council. In the event of a military operation, of
the Petersberg type for example 5u, requiring
troops to be sent to a region in the throes of
conflict, consulting the Assembly, coupled with a
vote in national parliaments authorising the
deployment of troops in the framework of such
54. Die Zeit,9th March 1995.
55. Bulletin Europe, No.6453, 1st April 1995, page 2; Report
of the Netherlands Government on the common foreign,
security and defence policy of the European Union: towards
more energetic action abroad.
56. WEU's military missions are defined in paragraph 4 of
Part II of the Petersberg declaration which provides that:
" Apart from contributing to the cornmon defence in accord-
ance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of
WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU,
could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks;
peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis-man-
agement, including peace-making "; Document 1322,
29th htne 1992.
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missions would constitute the element of Euro-
pean parliamentary supervision that is at present
lacking.
ll7. By thus strengthening the link between the
Assembly and the national parliaments, such pro-
cedure also preserves and affirms the intergovern-
mental nature of European security and defence,
without diminishing its effectiveness, and elimi-
nates the democratic deficit at national and Euro-
pean levels of which intergovernmental co-opera-
tion stands accused. This also assumes that the
quality of the relationship between the Assembly
and the Council, including the Secretariat-Gen-
eral and other WEU bodies, is improved, particu-
larly as regards information. It is in this perspect-
ive that an Assembly composed of representatives
from national defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees acquires its full meaning.
118. Proposals in this direction have moreover
been presented in a study carried out jointly by the
WEU Instirute for Security Studies and the Euro-
pean Strategy Group, which might be considered
as a contribution to the 1996 Conference. In this
collective work the authors suggest establishing ajoint parliamentary defence committee formed by
representatives of the European Parliament toge-
ther with members of the defence committees of
national parliaments. According to the authors,
such a committee might gain more budgetary and
control powers than the present Assembly of
WEU, which might be reformed to that end 5'.
This will clearly be a matter of continuing debate.
119. In its report adopted in Lisbon on 16th May
1995 on the future of European security and the
preparation of Maastricht tr 
- 
reply to the fortieth
annual report of the Council, the Political Com-
mittee of the Assembly considers, on the contrary,
that 'o one must reject any proposal tending to
create mixed parliamentary institutionss' ". Accord-
ing to the Rapporteur, " this solution would not
only have the disadvantage of creating a two-
speed [European parliamentary] assembly, but,
far from improving efficiency, would conffibute
also to a blurring of responsibilities. " On this
matter, the committee stated that it favoured the
creation of a second European chamber, alongside
the European Parliament, composed of " delega-
tions from national parliaments, with responsibili-
57. Towards a corlmon defence policy - study by the Euro-
pean Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, 1995, page 68.
58. The future of European security and the preparation of
Maastricht tr - reply to the fortieth annual report of the Coun-
cil; Document 1458, paragraph 84, l6th May 1995.
ties that are different from and complementary to
those of the European Parliament "5e which would
deal with security and defence questions.
120. Another question still pending in this debate
is the place to be given after the intergovernmen-
tal conference to the Central European countries
that are to become members of the European
Union in the next century. Integration of WEU in
the European Union might leave them for some
time outside any European security structure, pen-
ding their possibly joining NATO. Such uncer-
tainty might make economic reform harder to
achieve in certain countries, such as for example
the Baltic countries in the immediate vicinity of
the Russian Federation and hence unable to hope
for early accession to the alliance while no agree-
ment has been reached on this question between
the latter and the Russian government. Participa-
tion of the Cenfral European counffies in the acti-
vities of WEU, where they have associate parmer
status, is enabling them to attach themselves to
some extent to European security structures
without putting themselves in a situation of
conflict vis-d-vis the Russian Federation. Hasty
integration of WEU into the European Union
without first resolving the question of these coun-
tries' accession to the latter would make them
very vulnerable to various kinds of external pres-
sure.
121. The decisions to be taken by the 1996 inter-
governmental conference will affect the future of
WEU and also that of the Assembly. But, at the
same time, it is necessary to maintain and optim-
ise parliamentary supervision and participation at
both national and European level, with the help of
a reformed WEU Assembly with wider responsi-
bilities and which is even more representative.
This report is not directly concerned with the
wider political arguments on future relations bet-
ween the EU and WEU, but there can be little
doubt that any steps towards bringing defence
matters within the competence of the European
Commission and European Parliament might
endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and
security matters by national parliaments and the
WEU Assembly, through which the sovereignty
of nation states continues to be expressed in the
late twentieth century.
2t
59. Idem; draft recommendation, paragraph I.8.
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